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ABSTRACT 
Since the first successful attempt to clone a dog in 2005, dogs have been cloned by Somatic Cell Nuclear 
Transfer (SCNT) for a variety of purposes. One of these is to clone dogs as companion animals. In this paper 
we discuss some of the ethical implications that cloning companion dogs through SCNT encompasses, 
specifically in relation to human-dog relationships, but also regarding animal welfare and animal integrity. 
We argue that insofar as we understand the relationship with our companion dogs as one of friendship, the 
meaningfulness of cloning a companion dog is seriously questionable. Cloning may both disrupt the 
uniqueness of the relationship, as the shared history underlying the relationship can neither be repeated nor 
copied, and it may violate the meaning we attribute to friendship, as the notion of singularity inherent in our 
understanding of friendship is incompatible with the replaceability embedded in the practice of cloning. We 
further argue that the application of cloning technology to companion dogs can be interpreted as a violation 
of the integrity of dogs on at least two accounts: negative welfare implications associated with the cloning 
process, and the instrumentalisation of the dog inherent in cloning. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Since the first successful attempt to clone a dog in 2005 (Lee et al. 2005) dogs have been cloned through 
Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) for a variety of purposes. Examples of the opportunities generated by 
the technology include the cloning of elite service dogs such as drug-hounds, cancer-detecting dogs or dogs 
for aiding disabled people, strategies to preserve threatened canine species, and new approaches to research 
in human diseases and medicine (Lee 2014). Furthermore, with its promise to provide a genetic copy of a 
pre-existing animal, the technology has given rise to a new market: the service of cloning companion dogs. 
The market is not a big one, and commercial cloning of pet dogs is, to our knowledge, currently performed 
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by only a couple of companies worldwide, requiring a sizable payment of around US $100.000 for the 
service.2 However, the reportedly long waiting list at such companies suggests that the customer base may be 
growing.  
There appears to be a growing interest in applying biotechnologies to companion animals in general. 
Miniature pigs, for instance, are pigs that are genetically modified to remain very small. While originally 
produced for research purposes, they have attracted increasing interest for use as companion animals due to 
appealing qualities like small size and 'cuteness', and are now commercially produced as such, to increase 
business (Cyranoski 2015). Another example is the GloFish, which is an ornamental fish genetically 
modified to glow in a variety of bright colours, and marketed as an entertaining and decorative addition to 
the home.3 
The application of biotechnologies such as genetic modification and cloning to companion animals gives rise 
to a range of ethical issues. In this paper we focus exclusively on the cloning of companion dogs. Although 
the discussion is also relevant to other animals held as companion animals, such as horses and cats, we have 
chosen this focus as the relationship between dog and owner is often seen as the paradigmatic example of 
friendship between humans and animals, captured in the phrase ‘Man’s best friend’. We will discuss some of 
the ethical implications entailed by cloning companion dogs by SCNT, specifically in relation to the 
following three concerns: 1) Welfare issues relating to the surrogate mother and the clone. The technology 
of SCNT has not yet been perfected, and has severe implications for many of the animals involved in terms 
of suffering and diminished welfare. 2) Mortality rates and possible violation of the integrity of the cloned 
dog and the clone. Cloning technology entails a degree of power over the reproductive context of the animals 
not previously achieved. It allows us to produce an almost genotypical replicate of an animal for the purpose 
of creating a phenotypical copy of the original animal. The ethical issues in this area concern whether the 
mortality rates are ethically problematic, whether cloning can be said to infringe on or violate the integrity of 
the animals involved, and whether the view of animals embedded in the desire to clone them as companion 
animals is ethically acceptable. 3) The human-dog relationship. The paradigm relationship between human 
and companion dog often involves affection, emotional attachment, and a long-term commitment, and the 
application of cloning technology to dogs prompts considerations of whether cloning is a meaningful 
expression of this relationship, or if it somehow violates the nature of the purported human-dog friendship.  
We begin by describing the technology of animal cloning and welfare issues typically attached to it. We then 
analyse the ethical issues related to increased mortality rates and the question of whether cloning is a 
violation of the animal’s integrity. Finally, we analyse the relationship between humans and companion dogs 
through an understanding of this relationship as an expression of human-animal friendship, and discuss the 
specific ethical concerns that cloning of dogs gives rise to in such a perspective. 
 
1 WELFARE ISSUES 
1.1 Cloning technologies  
The technology of somatic cell nuclear transfer was first successfully applied to a mammal by Dr. Ian 
Wilmut's group in 1996 to produce the sheep Dolly (Wilmut et al. 1997). Since then, the technology, with 
 
2 Sooam Biotech in South Korea, and ViaGen Pets in Texas, USA. 
3 See the GloFish webshop: www.glofish.com 
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certain moderations, has been used to clone a variety of animals, including mice, rats, cats, dogs, cattle, 
horses, and camels (Verma and Arora 2015). The basic technology consists of removing the nucleus from an 
unfertilised egg cell (female gamete) of the species to be cloned and replacing it with a somatic cell nucleus 
from e.g. a muscle cell from the animal to be cloned. The egg can now be manipulated into acting like a 
fertilised egg which, when developed into a blastocyst, can be transferred to the womb of a host animal 
where the blastocyst can develop to term (Vajta and Gjerris 2006).  
The resulting animal will thus be an almost exact genotypical copy of the animal from which the original 
somatic cell nucleus was taken, albeit there will be minor differences due to the mitochondrial DNA left in 
the donor egg cell used in the process. The importance of this is still unclear but at least some of the reasons 
for the low success rates and welfare problems connected to cloned animals have been attributed to this (St. 
John 2014). Moreover, epigenetic factors influencing the original animal and the clone can account for the 
phenotypical differences often observed between the original animal and the clone (Heegaard 2013). The 
latter is particularly important here, as it questions the possibility of resemblance in looks and behaviour 
between the original companion dog and a later clone, which in turn might influence the perception of the 
cloned individual as well as the relationship between owner and dog. We shall return to this below (see 
section 4). 
 
1.2 Mortality rates and impaired welfare  
The science of cloning is a relatively new one, and still has significant shortcomings. Success rates are 
dependent on the species but are generally low, associated with increased mortality at all stages of 
development (Ross and Feltrin 2014) and increased welfare problems for viable animals (Hill 2014). The 
success rates in canine cloning vary greatly and depend on a wide range of factors, such as breed, donor cell 
type, and method of cloning. They are, however, currently very low with the most successful lying on around 
4%, meaning that around 4% of the oocytes transferred to surrogate mothers will develop into pups (Lee 
2014). The low success rates are closely related to the significant health and welfare problems for the 
animals involved. The data regarding health and welfare issues specifically pertaining to the cloning of dogs 
is very limited, but experience from other animals, primarily cattle and pigs, shows that many of the animals 
involved - mostly the surrogate mothers and the clones - suffer from a wide range of problems. 
In general, surrogate mothers experience pregnancy failures and gestational issues associated with carrying 
cloned foetuses, as well as increased rates of abortion, excess foetal size, dystocia, hydrops, placental 
abnormalities, and consequential Caesarean sections. The rate of embryo survival is therefore very low. 
These difficulties are likely to involve suffering, anxiety and distress for the animal, and in addition may 
affect the future fertility of the female (EFSA 2008). 
Experience from a range of species indicates that around half of the clones surviving the gestation period die 
during birth or within the first months of life (EFSA 2008; The Danish Animal Ethics Council 2016). The 
cloned animals are at high risk of suffering from developmental abnormalities such as reduced birth weight, 
partially undeveloped or enlarged organs, deformities, respiratory failure, increased susceptibility to disease, 
reluctance to suckle, and difficulty in breathing and standing. Although these problems can also happen in 
natural births, they occur with a higher frequency in cloned offspring, contributing to the low rates of 
animals surviving into adulthood (The Danish Animal Ethics Council 2016). Having survived the first 
months, however, the cloned animals seem to develop normally, with no unique health risks; growth, 
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lifespan, and reproductive capabilities appear similar to animals that are not cloned.4 Nor have any problems 
been recorded with the offspring of clones (EFSA 2012).  
It should be noted that according to Directive 2010/63/EU on the use of animals in research, animal foetuses 
are considered objects of legal concern from the last trimester of pregnancy, i.e. their welfare matters. 
Although cloning performed in breeding does not fall under this legislation, it shows that foetuses 
undergoing the same procedure would, if part of a research project, have been considered as beings with 
individual welfare, and hence the process requires the legal performance of ethical evaluation and approval.  
From an animal welfare perspective, it can be argued that the high mortality rates are unproblematic to the 
extent that they do not lead to negative mental states in the foetuses or surrogate moms. From other ethical 
perspectives, however, there are broader ethical issues than welfare, such as keeping companion animals at 
all, loss of animal lives, and animal integrity. The latter two will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2 DEATH AND INTEGRITY 
2.1 Is death an animal ethics issue? 
From a common-sense point of view, causing the death of another sentient being is an ethical issue. To take 
such a life is prima facie wrong, but can, depending on the ethical perspective, be more or less justified. 
Since the very beginning of the animal ethics debate philosophers have argued that animals have the right to 
their own life, owing to both certain capacities (sentience or rationality) and to the extent that taking an 
animal life has an adverse influence on certain human qualities or virtues deemed desirable to promote (e.g. 
tenderness, unselfishness) (Walters and Portmess 1999). Theologians have added animals’ closeness to God 
as an argument, stating that since humans did not create animals, we have no right to kill them (Preece 
2002). However, the more dominant view has been that humans are the crown of creation and - transformed 
into philosophical argumentation that stresses human superiority typically based on human rationality - this 
has been understood as legitimising the killing of animals. From a consequentialist perspective (e.g. Jeremy 
Bentham or Peter Singer) death in itself is ethically irrelevant, since a dead being has no interests. Rather, 
what matters is how the being perceives its situation while alive, and what a sentient being having a ‘good 
life’ contributes with to the calculation of overall consequences. If euthanised or dead, the animal has neither 
good nor bad experiences to add to the overall calculation of best possible outcome in terms of overall 
happiness or preference satisfaction – and the death of the animal is therefore ethically neutral (Singer 2011). 
If, on the other hand, the being as such matters, and not merely its experiences, causing death is relevant as it 
denies the continuation of this very being. Tom Regan, often regarded as the most influential modern 
philosopher in the defence of (certain) animals’ right to their lives, argued that so-called subjects of a life are 
entitled not only to be alive, but also to a decent life without instrumentalisation, i.e. not to be held or used 
for the sake of another’s purpose (Regan 1984). 
From a virtue ethics point of view, another issue comes to the fore. The ethical justification of an act is no 
longer linked to the criteria for the action (maximising overall good or respecting rights) but to the question 
of which virtues the actor should express in the situation to build a flourishing life by developing and 
employing virtues such as justice, courage and humbleness. Furthermore, it is not the moral status of the 
 
4 However, some studies seem to indicate increased mortality in adult clones as compared to sexually reproduced 
animals (EFSA 2008). 
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object of concern (here the animal) that is of primary interest, but rather how the morally responsible agent 
decides to act towards it. Hence, although the context sensitivity of this approach opens the way for a variety 
of correct actions, in order to justify killing animals one needs to show how this can be an expression of the 
right virtues towards animals. It may be courageous to kill an aggressive wolf, but it can be just as much a 
lack of righteousness if the wolf is stressed due to hunger caused by urbanisation and deprivation of its 
natural habitat.  
 
2.2 Integrity as wholeness and uniqueness  
In line with the reasons given above to consider causing animal death an ethical issue, philosophers like Bart 
Rutgers and Robert Heeger have argued in favour of the concept of animal integrity. They define integrity as 
“wholeness and intactness of the animal and its species-specific balance, as well as the capacity to sustain 
itself in an environment suitable to the species” (Rutgers and Heeger 1999). The general idea behind this 
concept is thus to respect the animal as such in its ’being itself’, in order to e.g. protect it from breeding 
schemes aimed at adopting its genetic traits to barren housing conditions (Olsson, Gamborg and Sandøe 
2006). An animal’s integrity is respected when kept in an environment and social context where it may 
practise species-specific behaviour and live a life without external disturbance of its ‘normal’ physical 
processes. The cloning process can thus be questioned from an integrity perspective. The embryo, the ‘being 
to come’, would develop into another being without human interaction, and the change to this ‘potential 
original’ being can be regarded as a violation of its integrity. For a more elaborate discussion of the meaning 
of animal integrity, please see Röcklinsberg et al. 2014. 
The concept of animal integrity has been included in animal legislation in several countries (CH, NL) in the 
context of biotechnology in order to create a zone for additional ethical reflection on the genetic modification 
of animals (Rippe 2011). Further, in line with the idea of flourishing, Martha Nussbaum points out that an 
animal is a wonderful and awe-inspiring complex life form that we cannot create from scratch, but which 
rather may inspire us to see its completeness and interconnectedness with other beings (Nussbaum 2006). 
That is, integrity is acknowledged as a ’zone of untouchableness’ reflecting the independent existence of the 
animal. Hence, excluding the concept of integrity (or similar, such as dignity, intrinsic value) from ethical 
deliberations basically limits the possibility to take aspects other than welfare into consideration in animal 
ethics. Based on this, we argue that, albeit proven difficult to implement in legislation, integrity is a useful 
ethical concept mirroring a common human experience of animals being other beings-in-flesh to whom we 
can relate (Merleau-Ponty 1969). 
Given that an animal has integrity, understood in this way, it is relevant to reflect on what may be regarded 
as violation of this integrity, and whether violating it is ethically justifiable in certain situations. With regard 
to the first issue, we argue that the above-mentioned welfare implications of cloning constitute a violation of 
the animal's integrity, similar to a situation where poor housing conditions lead to limitations in fulfilling 
species-specific needs. Such treatment of an animal implies a lack of respect for its wholeness, and its ’zone 
of untouchableness’ is transgressed. Further, the cloning process (as other reproductive technologies) itself 
can be seen as violating the animal’s integrity by reducing the uniqueness and random nature of the animal´s 
genome to serve human purposes of no relevance to the animal. The process thus instrumentalises the animal 
from the very outset and reduces it to an artefact whose value is strictly limited to its properties. Finally, if 
infringement in the reproduction process is seen as violating the integrity of an individual, then not only is 
the clone’s integrity violated but also that of the surrogate mother and the female dog ‘donating’ her eggs.  
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The discussions above can be said to have a general bearing on the evaluation of many kinds of animal 
cloning. In the following we will analyse more specifically what cloning technology brings to the special 
relation between humans and dogs 
 
3 THE HUMAN-DOG RELATIONSHIP 
3.1 Why are we so attached to our dogs? An empirical perspective  
How and why people become emotionally attached to their dogs is a complex matter, and the relationship, 
the associated love, friendship, or bond between humans and dogs can be approached from different angles, 
e.g. philosophical and psychological. When questioning the relationship as such, the aspects raised also 
depend on whether we look at it from the human’s point of view or try to see it from the dog’s perspective. 
However, if we approach the discussion empirically from the voice of the human, we can gain insight into 
the distinctiveness of different kinds of relationships between human and dog, and what it is about the dog 
that elicits particular attachments between humans and dogs.  
The concept of attachment was originally used to conceptualise child-parent relationships (e.g. Ainsworth et 
al. 1978), but attachment theories have expanded in scope to include adult relationships, relationships with 
friends and family members, and they also work as useful frameworks for exploring the human-companion 
animal relation (e.g. Beck and Madresh 2015). That humans often view the relationship with their dogs as 
similar to those with friends, family members, or children is widely accepted in research on human-animal 
relations (Archer 1997; Greenebaum 2004; Hens 2008), and comparing relationships with dogs to 
relationships with human intimates is common in everyday references (e.g. ‘my best friend’, ‘my baby’, ‘my 
darling’). Of course, different people have different relationships with their dogs, and the roles dogs play in 
people’s lives vary and likely depend on a range of cultural and socio-demographic factors as well as the 
characteristics of the individual dog. However, the dog is sometimes reduced to a mere status symbol – to a 
means of displaying elite status, to a vocation – e.g. breeding and ownership for showing/exhibiting, or to 
equipment – e.g. used for hunting, therapeutic purposes, protection of property or other animals etc. 
(Hirschman 1994). 
On the other hand, when humans view their dogs as companions, friends, partners, or children, intimate and 
emotional relations occur, occasionally to a level where the dog is seen as essentially human and a full 
substitute for the company of a human being (Belk 1996). Sometimes dogs rank even higher than humans in 
terms of specific social or relational provisions, e.g. reliable alliance, nurturance, and companionship (Bonas, 
McNicholas, and Collins 2000; cited in Serpell 2002). Many people mourn their dogs when they die (Wrobel 
2003; Chur-Hansen 2010), sometimes to such an extent that a ‘replacement’ can never be envisaged, either 
because the owner believes that the dog is irreplaceable as an individual being or because the owner could 
not go through such grief again (Belk 1996). Some people also believe that their dog possesses specific 
attributes that match the owner’s ideal expectations of love and attachment: the tendency to be very 
affectionate, to welcome the owner intensely whenever he or she returns home, to be highly expressive, and 
to attend closely to everything the owner says or does (Serpell 1996). 
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Care-giving can be seen as a specific part of the explanation for why people are emotionally attached to their 
dogs (Archer 1997; Mosteller 2008; Julius et al. 2013), and training and caring for dogs as well as feeling 
guilt or pride in their behaviour have parallels to raising a child (Belk 1996). In sum, there are several 
similarities between the owner-dog relationships which humans establish and reinforce, and relationships 
between people. Furthermore, people seem to be attracted and attached to features of the dog and of the 
owner-dog relationship that are essentially human. 
 
3.2 An Aristotelian perspective on friendship 
According to Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) a true friendship is characterised by equality of power and status, a 
genuine desire for the good of the other for the other's own sake, and mutual recognition and reciprocation of 
the other's goodwill (Aristotle 2000). True friendship, moreover, cannot be based upon any benefits that may 
be derived from it. If you befriend another for the sake of gaining something, say pleasure or utility, the 
friendship is not a true one in the Aristotelian sense. 
The requirement for equality in Aristotle's account of friendship leaves much wanting if we seek to 
understand the relationship between humans and dogs as 'friendships'. Most human-dog relationships are 
characterised by a significant asymmetry of power and dependence. Even in the designation of the human as 
the dog-owner, there seems to be a disparity that prevents any comparison between human friendships and 
the relationship between humans and dogs: we do not buy our human friends, we do not own them, and we 
do not check their pedigrees for hereditary diseases before we befriend them. Dogs depend on their owners; 
on our goodwill, commitment, and insight to a degree that our friends normally do not. And a dog has no 
possibility of leaving us if we fail or hurt them, as friends are free to do.  
The element of reciprocity is equally deficient. In a relationship between human and dog, where the dog is 
seen as a companion (friend) more than as an instrument to achieve certain human goals (hunting, 
shepherding, breeding etc.), dog-owners are generally expected to provide a caring home for their dog, offer 
proper daily care and veterinary treatment if needed. The dog, on the other hand, is not expected to do 
anything other than keep within the confines of what is seen as being well-behaved and, through this, to 
bring joy and companionship into the lives of humans in a variety of ways. The dog cannot be expected to 
desire happiness for you, to put aside its own wants and whims for your pleasure, or to assume responsibility 
for your welfare, even though many dog-owners experience the dog reacting to their emotional states (see 
below). While dog-owners have both legal and moral responsibility for their dog, the dog cannot be held 
morally accountable for its conduct. It is not a ‘bad dog’ in a moral sense when it barks out of excitement or 
anger; it merely exhibits its natural behaviour. Thus the relationship between human and dog will inevitably 
lack reciprocity in relation to both behaviour and to moral responsibility.  
From an Aristotelian viewpoint, then, a relationship between a dog and its owner can hardly be called 
friendship. The relationship differs too much in vital respects. However, although reciprocity and equality 
certainly are important characteristics in our everyday understanding of friendship, there is one aspect that is 
perhaps even more central to it, as also discussed by Aristotle: the notion of singularity. In a true friendship, 
according to Aristotle, you love the other for the very person she is and has been during your friendship, and 
not only for the qualities she possesses. If you love someone merely for her qualities, if she is useful or 
pleasant to you, for instance, you ultimately love her for your own sake, not for hers, and your love would be 
contingent upon her continuing to be useful or pleasant (Aristotle 2000). As Thomas Hurka has also 
remarked, certain qualities are likely to be the traits that attract you to a person in the first place, but once a 
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friendship has developed, your love is no longer directed towards the qualities only, but primarily to the 
individual she is and has been during the time you have known each other (Hurka 2013). Were you to find 
someone who has your friend's qualities to a greater degree, you would not simply replace your friend with 
the new one. A friend can alter or lose some of her qualities over time, or gain new ones, while your 
friendship remains intact. The reason, Hurka argues, is that to love a person for the person she is, is partly to 
love her for her historical qualities, which means her having participated with you in a shared past, a past 
that no one else can have (Hurka 2013). Your shared history, then, represents the singularity of your 
friendship. A person with identical qualities cannot replace your friend, because she is not your friend; you 
have no shared history. When viewing a friend as singular, as a particular individual, and not as a specimen, 
the friend is by definition irreplaceable.  
Although dogs are not friends in many aspects of the Aristotelian sense of friendship, the analogy that 
appears in light of the notion of singularity is quite clear. The relationship you have with your dog is a 
relationship with a particular dog. For most dog-owners, preferring your dog to another dog, even if the other 
dog is better behaved, or not as annoyingly energetic as yours, is meaningful. After all, the other dog is not 
your dog: it is not the dog with whom you have a history and a present relation. The significant analogies 
between human-dog relationships and friendships, we will argue, can help illuminate some important ethical 
issues when cloning companion dogs.  
 
4: ETHICAL ASPECTS OF CLONING A FRIEND 
The cloning of animals in general raises a number of ethical issues, as shown above. Due to the special 
relation between humans and dogs, cloning dogs as companion animals fosters additional concerns. Here we 
will focus on how the understanding of this relationship as a kind of friendship can be disrupted by the 
technology. 
First of all, the uniqueness of the relationship seems to be disrupted. Recall the notion of singularity in 
friendships, and the shared history that underlies it. Even if it was possible to identify all the qualities of a 
certain friend that elicit your love and affection for her, you could not simply replace your friend with a 
person that has the same qualities. You could not even replace her with a genetic copy of herself, because the 
relevant 'self' of your friend lies in the person that has emerged from your particular history together. A 
friendship is built upon, and nurtured by, a history that friends share with each other, and that history, by its 
very nature, cannot be repeated with any other being. 
If the purpose of cloning your dog is to obtain a new dog that bears as close a resemblance to the original as 
possible, it assumes that the history shared is unimportant to the relationship. Instead of beginning a new 
friendship with a new dog, it is sought to continue or repeat something that has already happened and ended. 
If this is possible, the truth of the idea that dogs are unique must be questioned. If the same relationship can 
be continued with a new individual, it is hard to see that there was ever an individual, but rather a specimen 
of a species that could be exchanged with another specimen in much the same way a broken dishwasher can 
be replaced with a new one of the same model. If that is possible, then it seems hard to claim that dogs are 
individuals with which humans can have meaningful relationships, much less relationships resembling 
friendships – thus also questioning why it makes sense to clone the original dog in the first place, given that 
it could be replaced with any similar dog. 
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Do people who decide to clone their dog not truly love their dog then? Or do they love something about their 
dog more than they love the dog itself? Our point is that we must consider what sort of relationship we want 
to have with our dogs. Insofar as we view dogs as individuals, the question becomes whether cloning is the 
right way to treat an individual that is considered a friend. If friends are singular beings, and the notion of 
singularity is incompatible with the notion of replaceability, cloning a friend seems to violate the very 
meaning we attribute to friendship. Consider also the points on animal integrity mentioned above: the 
process of cloning reduces the dog to an artefact that should have certain properties, depending on the wishes 
of the human, and the dog is effectively treated as a being that first and foremost must fulfil those wishes. 
With regard to the original dog, therefore, one can question whether it is an appropriate way of showing 
compassion and respect to seek to copy that individual instead of honouring the uniqueness of this particular 
individual and relationship through grieving and memories. With regard to the new dog, one must question 
whether a sound relationship can be built when the human part of it expects the new individual to take the 
place of a former individual instead of being given a chance to carve out a new relationship. Obviously, there 
is also a risk that the clone will be a disappointment to the owner, since it will not be an exact copy of the 
original due to the epigenetic factors that also influence who we become, be it man or dog. The expectations 
linked to the clone being a clone of a previous friend may hinder more than facilitate a new friendship, and 
the relationship may be coloured by disappointment and frustration. Cloning a companion dog, then, seems 
to effectively prevent both the new and the original dog from being part of a relationship of friendship in any 
meaningful sense of the term. 
To some, a further ethical issue is the number of dogs lost from embryos that do not develop into individuals 
and those that, considering the imperfections of the technology, will be lost during birth or shortly after, in an 
attempt to secure a healthy clone of the original dog. Each of these would represent a potential replacement 
of the original friend that has either never developed into a sentient being or has died early, sometimes 
involving suffering. Would this be a way to honour the friendship once enjoyed? Or would it be an 
expression of putting one´s own needs before the other party in a friendship, to such a degree that the death 
and/or suffering of one´s friend would be subjugated to one’s own desires? The latter is not typically seen as 
an integral part of a relationship based on friendship.  
Based on this, it is hard to see how cloning a dog that is considered a friend can ever function. The very 
process of cloning turns the dog into an instrument to satisfy human needs. Not only is this problematic from 
an animal ethics point of view, but it seems to bear within it a contradiction of the very relationship sought to 
be re-established with the clone. Even though dogs may be cloned, then, it seems that friends may not. 
 
5: CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we have discussed some of the ethical issues related to the cloning of companion dogs, 
specifically those concerning animal welfare, animal integrity, and the human-dog relationship. We have 
argued that the application of cloning technology to companion dogs can be interpreted as a violation of the 
dogs’ integrity on at least two accounts: the negative welfare implications associated with the cloning 
process, and the instrumentalisation of the dog inherent in cloning, essentially reducing the dog to the 
purpose of serving human interests. Cloning companion dogs can therefore be seen as a denial of the 
animals’ intrinsic value. 
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We further argue that the relationship between human and dog is susceptible to alterations if cloning is 
introduced as an element of the relationship. Cloning may both disrupt the uniqueness of the relationship, as 
the shared history underlying the relationship can neither be repeated nor copied, and may violate the 
meaning we attribute to friendship, as the notion of singularity inherent in our understanding of friendship is 
incompatible with the replaceability required by the practice of cloning. Insofar as we understand the 
relationships with our companion dogs as ones of friendship, then the meaningfulness of and ethical values 
underlying cloning a companion dog are open to serious questioning. 
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